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ABSTRACT 
Several results concerning the problem of U.S. 'Congressional 
apportionment are given which together indicate that a method 
first proposed by Daniel Webster (also known as "Major Fractions") 
is fairest judged on the basis of common sense, Constitutional 
requirement, and precedent. 
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THE WEBSTER METHOD OF APPORTIONMENT 
M.L. B a l i n s k i  and H . P .  Young 
Yale U n i v e r s i t y ,  New Haven, C onnec t i cu t  
and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Applied 
Systems A n a l y s i s  
1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The C o n s t i t u t i o n  of t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  
House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  be  appo r t i oned  among t h e  s e v e r a l  s t a t e s  
accord ing  t o  t h e i r  census  p o p u l a t i o n s .  Var ious  methods f o r  s o  
doing have been advanced over  t h e  y e a r s ,  beg inn ing  i n  1792 a f t e r  
t h e  f i r s t  c en su s .  Four d i f f e r e n t  methods have been used.  I n  
s t u d y i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  methods t h e r e  emerge s e v e r a l  
c r i t e r i a  which we b e l i e v e  t o  be  most impor t an t  by r e a s o n  of  
common s e n s e ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  and p r eceden t .  
The aim o f  t h i s  n o t e  i s  t o  se t  down, f o r  t h e  r e c o r d ,  s e v e r a l  
r e s u l t s  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  i n t e r p l a y  between t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  which 
t o g e t h e r  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  one method b e s t  answers t h e  needs .  D e -  
t a i l e d  p r o o f s  w i l l  ap p ea r  e l sewhere .  
D e f i n i t i o n s  and Elementary P r o p e r t i e s  
An appor t ionment  problem i s  s p e c i f i e d  by an s - v e c t o r  ( s z 2 )  
of r a t i o n a l  numbers p  = ( p l  , . . . ,ps)  , a l l  pi > 0,  and an i n t e g e r  
- 
house s i z e  h  2 - 0. An appor t ionment  of  h  among s i s  an  i n t e g e r  
-
s - v e c t o r  a  = ( a l I . . . , a s )  2 0  w i t h  Eiai = h. An appor t ionment  
- - - 
method i s  a  mul t i -va lued  f u n c t i o n  M(p;h) so t h a t ,  f o r  e a c h  p >  0  
- - - 
and h  - > 0 ,  M i s  a  se t  o f  appor t ionments  a  of h  among s (sometimes 
- - - 
unique,  sometimes n o t )  . M(')  -., deno te s  a  method f o r  f i x e d  S; 
M ( " ~ )  f o r  f i x e d  s and h. A p a r t i c u l a r  M-solution i s  a s i n g l e -  
-., ..d 
valued f u n c t i o n  f ,  ..d w i t h  .., f  (p ;h)  ..d = a ~ M ( p , h ) .  
- 5 
The quota  of s t a t e  i f o r  h , s  i s  qi = pih/l jp j .  The lower 
* 
quota  is  Lqil: t h e  upper quota  r q i l .  
The fo l lowing  e lementary p r o p e r t i e s  d e f i n e  more e x p l i c i t l y  
what i s  meant by a  method t h a t  appor t ions  ' accord ing  t o  numbers'. 
Method M - is homogeneous when aEM(X?;h) - -., i f  and on ly  i f  a ~ M ( ? ; h )  -., - 
f o r  a l l  r a t i o n a l  X > 0. I t  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  i f  a  ..d = q - i s  unique 
i n  M(?;h) - whenever t h e  quo ta s  qi a r e  a l l  i n t e g e r .  These proper-  
t i es  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  very  i d e a  of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y .  A method 
i s  symmetric i f  f o r  any permutat ion n  of  1 , .  . . , s ,  ( aT  ,. . I 
a n ( s ) ) E M ( ( ~ n ( ~ )  * * . ' P n ( s )  ) ; h) i f  and on ly  i f  a  .-- E ~ ( p ; h )  - . . d  . ~ h u s  
only  t h e  numbers count ,  n o t  t h e  names of s t a t e s .  
F i n a l l y ,  a  method i s  non-degenerate i f  pn+ - p - and a  -  EM(^";^) ..,- 
f o r  a l l  n  i m p l i e s  a  E M(p;h) . So, i f  t h e  pn a r e  a  sequence of  
- . . d -  - 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  a c c u r a t e e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  t r u e  popu la t ion  p ,  -., a l l  of  
which admit t h e  apport ionment  a by M,then s o  does  p. Th i s  i s  a 
- - - 
t e c h n i c a l  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  a l lows  f o r  a j u s t  handl ing  of t ies.  
These f o u r  p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  m e t  by a l l  methods which have, t o  
ou r  knowledge, e v e r  been proposed, and w e  assume them i n  t h e  
seque l  u n l e s s  o the rwi se  noted.  
Div isor  Methods 
A rank-index r ( p , a ) ,  a 2 - 0 i n t e g e r  and p  > 0 r a t i o n a l  is  
any real va lued  f u n c t i o n  s a t i s f y i n g  r ( p , a )  > r ( p , a + l ) .  The 
Huntington method based on r ( p , a )  [ 6 ]  i s  . 
~ ( p ; h )  = {a 2 0 : a integer, Lai = h~ maxi '(pitai) Lmin 
- 
a; >o r(pjfaj-1) I *  
- - - - -  i 
1 
A rank-index de te rmines  a method by a s s i g n i n g  p r i o r i t i e s  i n  
t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of seats by t h e  fol lowing r e c u r s i v e  r u l e  on t h e  
s i z e  of t h e  house ( h ' l  - h ) :  a t  h '  = 0 set a l l  ai = 0; i f  a appor- 
- 
t i o n s  h '  < h,  then  an apport ionment o f  h '  + 1 s e a t s  i s  fsund by 
g iv ing  one more seat t o  some s ta te  maximizing r ( p i , a i ) .  
* 
L x l  deno te s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  i n t e g e r  ( - x ,  r x l  t h e  s m a l l e s t  
i n t e g e r  2 - x. 
A d i v i s o r  c r i t e r i o n  d ( a ) ,  a  2 0  i n t e g e r ,  i s  any r e a l  va lued  
monotone i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n .  The d i v i s o r  method based on d ( a )  
i s  t h e  Hunt ington method based on r ( p ,  a )  = p/d ( a )  . W e  adopt  t h e  
conven t ion  t h a t  p  > q  i m p l i e s  p/O > q/O. 
A d i v i s o r  method i s  r e g u l a r  i f  e i t h e r  a  < d ( a )  - a  + 1  f o r  
a l l  a ,  o r  a  5 - d ( a )  < a  + 1  f o r  a l l  a .  
Lemma 1 .  A d i v i s o r  method i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  i f  and on ly  i f  
it i s  r e g u l a r .  
I t  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  know t h a t  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  o f  t h e  methods 
proposed - - w i t h  t h e  n o t a b l e  excep t ion  of  Hami l ton ' s  - -have been 
r e g u l a r  d i v i s o r  methods. These have r e c e i v e d  d i f f e r e n t  names and 
d e s c r i p t i o n s  i n  v a r i o u s  c o u n t r i e s  and t i m e s .  To t h e  b e s t  o f  o u r  
knowledge t h e y  should  be c r e d i t e d  i n  t e r m s  of  e a r l i e s t  d i s c o v e r y  
a s  fo l l ows .  John Quincy Adams' method [ I ]  has  d ( a )  = a ;  
James Dean 's  method [I71 (he  was P r o f e s s o r  o f  Astronomy and Math- 
ema t i c s  a t  Dartmouth and t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Vermont) has  d ( a )  = 
2 a ( a + 1 ) / ( 2 a + l ) .  E.V.  Hunt ing ton ' s  method of equa l  p r o p o r t i o n s  
[12,13] (he  was P r o f e s s o r  o f  Mathematics a t  Harvard) ha s  d ( a )  = 
. Daniel  Webs te r ' s  method [ I  71 ha s  d  ( a )  = a  + 1  / 2 .  
Thomas J e f f e r s o n ' s  method [I  51 has  d  ( a )  = a  + 1  . These a r e  a l l  
r e g u l a r ,  hence p r o p o r t i o n a l .  Hunt ington u n i f i e d  t h e s e  " h i s t o r i c  
f i v e  methods" th rough  h i s  tes t  of  i n e q u a l i t y  approach [12,13]  
and showed how t h e y  cou ld  be  computed r e c u r s i v e l y  u s i n g  d i v i s o r  
f u n c t i o n s .  I n  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  and n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r i e s  t h e  methods 
w e r e  d e s c r i b e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  ( though e q u i v a l e n t )  terms u s i n g  t h e  
i d e a  of  an  i d e a l  d i s t r i c t  s i z e  o r  common d i v i s o r ,  A .  F i r s t  a  
X i s  s p e c i f i e d ,  t h e n  t h e  numbers pi/X a r e  used t o  de te rmine  t h e  
appor t ionments  a  whose sum de t e rmines  h. For example, Adams ' i 
method rounds up a l l  f r a c t i o n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  sets a i  = Tpi/XI; 
J e f f e r s o n ' s  d rops  a l l  f r a c t i o n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  sets ai  = Lpi/A-l; and 
Webs te r ' s  method rounds t o  t h e  n e a r e s t  i n t e g e r ,  t h a t  i s ,  sets 
a  = Lpi/A + 1/21. i 
J e f f e r s o n ' s  method was used f o r  t h e  appor t ionments  based  on 
t h e  censuses  o f  1790 th rough  1840. Webs te r ' s  method was used f o r  
1910 and 1930. Hun t ing ton ' s  method o f  e q u a l  p r o p o r t i o n s  was used 
f o r  1930 --it happened t o  a g r e e  w i t h  Webs te r ' s  - -and s i n c e  1940 
it has  been t h e  law of  t h e  l a n d .  
House Monotonici ty 
Another e a r l y  method i s  Alexander Hamil ton 's  [ I l l , ,  r e - invented  
and used f o r  t h e  censuses  o f  1850 through 1900 under t h e  name 
"Vin ton ' s  Method o f  1850". I t  f i r s t  g i v e s  t o  each state i i t s  
lower quota  LqiJ; then  a s s i g n s  one a d d i t i o n a l  seat t o  each  of t h e  
1 (qi - LqiJ) s t a t e s  having t h e  l a r g e s t  remainder qi - LqiJ. ~ u t  
it admi ts  t h e  infamous Alabama paradox i n  which an i n c r e a s e  i n  
t h e  house can r e s u l t  i n  some s t a t e s  l o s i n g  s e a t s .  
A method M i s  house monotone i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  f o r  any p  some 
- - 
M-solution f  f o r  which f  (p;  h+l ) 2 f  ($;h) f o r  a l l  h. Congress ional  
- - - - - - 
deba te  makes c l e a r  t h a t  on ly  house monotone methods can b e  counte- 
nanced. A l l  ~ u n t i n g t o n  methods a r e  house monotone; indeed t h e  
q u e s t  f o r  house monotone methods i s  what mot iva ted  Hunt ing ton ' s  
work (see a l s o  Willcox [ I  81 ) . 
Uniformity 
An i n h e r e n t  p r i n c i p l e  of  f a i r  d i v i s i o n  is: every s u b d i v i s i o n  
of a  f a i r  d i v i s i o n  must be f a i r .  I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  apport ionment 
t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  can be formulated as fo l lows:  M i s  uniform [8] 
- 
i f  ( a , b )  - -. EM(p,q;h) i m p l i e s  (i) a E M ( ~ ; I ~ ~ ~ )  , and (ii) i f  a l s o  
- . - -  - - -  
a 1 € ~ ( p ; Z a i )  - -. - t h e n  ( a ' , b ) € M ( p , q ; h ) .  - - That  i s ,  an apport ionment 
- - . -  
accep tab le  f o r  a l l  s t a t e s  i s  a c c e p t a b l e  i f  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  any 
s u b s e t  of  s t a t e s  cons idered  a lone ;  moreover, i f  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  
admits a  d i f f e r e n t  apport ionment of t h e  same number of  s e a t s  then  
us ing  it i n s t e a d  r e s u l t s  i n  an  a l t e r n a t e  a c c e p t a b l e  apport ionment 
f o r  t h e  whole. 
Theorem 1 .  I f  a  method i s  uniform and p r o p o r t i o n a l ,  then  
it is  house monotone. 
I n  f a c t  t h e  proof  r e q u i r e s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  un i fo rmi ty ,  o n l y  
t h a t  two s t a t e s  having i d e n t i c a l  popu la t ions  cannot have appor- 
t ionments  d i f f e r i n g  by more t h a n  one s e a t .  (This  r e s u l t  was 
l a t e r  independent ly  no ted  by Hyllarpd [14] . )  S ince  t h e  Hamilton 
method i s  n o t  house monotone it i s  n o t  uniform. 
Theorem 2 .  A method i s  uniform and p r o p o r t i o n a l  i f  and 
on ly  i f  it i s  a Huntington method. 
This  fo l lows  d i r e c t l y  from an e a r l i e r  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of 
Huntington methods [ 61  and Theorem 1 .  
Populat ion Monotonicity 
Uniformity i n h e r e n t l y b e a r s  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  a  method should 
be a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a l l  problems wi th  a l l  p o s s i b l e  house s i z e s  and 
numbers of  s t a t e s .  A c r i t i c  might counter  t h a t  i n  many s i t u a t i o n s  
s and h a r e  f ixed :  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  h  = 435 and s = 50. So, 
l e t  us  f i x  s and h. 
A census provides  popula t ions  p  = 
- 
(pl  ,.. . , p S ) .  But t h e s e  
change over  t i m e ,  and e r r o r s  i n  census numbers may y i e l d  v a r i o u s  
p ' s .  A method must behave reasonably when app l i ed  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
- 
p ' s .  Many d e f i n i t i o n s  f o r  such behavior  a r e  conceivable .  The 
obvious mathematical  cho ice  i s  t o  compare two p ' s  i d e n t i c a l  i n  
- 
a l l  s t a t e  popula t ions  save  one,  and ask t h a t  a  method never a s s i g n  
t o  t h e  one s t a t e  having g r e a t e r  popula t ion  fewer s e a t s .  Actual  
populat ion changes over  t h e  y e a r s  do n o t  produce such s i t u a t i o n s .  
A method M ( s , ~ )  = M* (p )  (having f i x e d  s and h)  i s  popula t ion  
- - - 
monotone i f  a  EM* ( p )  , a '  €>I* ( p '  ) and pi /p!  > pi /pj  imply t h a t  
- - -  - - - 3 = -
a !  < ai  and a '  > a occurs  o n l y  i f  p j /p '  = p i / p  and ( a , ,  . . . , a  j, 
1 j j j J 
. . . ,a; ,  . . . ,as)  EM* (p )  . This  a v e r s  t h a t  i f  populatio 'ns change, 
apportionments should n o t  change by g iv ing  more s e a t s  t o  a  s t a t e  
wi th  r e l a t i v e l y  sma l l e r  popula t ion  and less s e a t s  t o  a  s t a t e  w i th  
r e l a t i v e l y  g r e a t e r  popula t ion  ( u n l e s s  t h e r e  i s  a " t i e " ) .  
Theorem 3. Fix s f 3 and h. M ( " ~ )  i s  popu la t ion  monotone 
- 
i f  and only  i f  it i s  a  d i v i s o r  method. 
The r e s u l t  i s  n o t  t r u e  f o r  s = 3: a counter-example e x i s t s  
f o r  h  = 7.  And, of course ,  t h e  d i v i s o r  i s  a func t ion  of s and h.  
Coro l la ry .  M i s  uniform and popula t ion  monotone i f  and 
- 
only  i f  it i s  a r e g u l a r  d i v i s o r  method. 
Invoking uni formi ty  t o g e t h e r  w i th  popula t ion  monotonici ty  
r e s u l t s  i n  a  d i v i s o r  independent of s and h,  which i s  what one 
would n a t u r a l l y  expec t .  I n  f a c t ,  we have shown t h a t  un i fo rmi ty  
and p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y ,  t o g e t h e r  w i th  t h e  very weak demand t h a t  
P i  > p j  must imply a i  2 a s u f f i c e s  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  d i v i s o r  j '  
methods ( a c t u a l l y  a somewhat more g e n e r a l  r e s u l t  o b t a i n s  i f  pro- 
p o r t i o n a l i t y  i s  dropped) [21 .  Hylland [ I 4 1  has  r e c e n t l y  found a 
s i m i l a r  r e s u l t .  
S a t i s f y i n g  Quota 
The most p r i m i t i v e  r e q u e s t  f o r  a  method of  appor t ionment  i s  
t h a t  it should  g u a r a n t e e  t o  each  s t a t e  a t  l e a s t  i t s  lower  quo t a  
and a t  most i t s  upper  q u o t a ,  LqiA 5 - a .  < r q i l ,  f o r  a l l  i. Methods 
1 = 
w i t h  t h i s  p rope r ty  a r e  s a i d  t o  s a t i s f y  quo ta .  The Hamilton 
method i s  p r e d i c a t e d  on it, a s  i s  t h e  Quota method [ 3 , 9 1 .  I t  i s  
an  u n f o r t u n a t e  f a c t  t h a t  it i s  s imply imposs ib l e  t o  have a method 
which s a t i s f i e s  quo t a  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  o t h e r  fundamental  c r i t e r i a .  
Theorem 4 .  There  i s  no uniform method t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  quo ta .  
Theorem 5. F i x  s 2 - 4 and h l a r g e  ( h  - s+3 s u f f i c e s ) .  There 
i s  n o ' p o p u l a t i o n  monotone method M 
- 
( S f h )  t h a t  
s a t i s f i e s  quo ta .  
So even f o r  f i x e d  s t h e r e  i s  no method M 
" 
which r e c o n c i l e s  
t h e  p r i m i t i v e  wish  t o  s a t i s f y  quo t a  w i t h  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  popula-  
t i o n  monoton ic i ty .  For s = 3 a s p e c i a l  r e s u l t  o b t a i n s .  
Theorem 6 .  The method of  Webster i s  t h e  unique d i v i s o r  
method which s a t i s f i e s  quo t a  f o r  s = 3 .  
S a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a - - a s  d e s i r a b l e  a s  it may b e - - i s  incom- 
p a t i b l e  w i t h  u n i f o r m i t y  and w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n  monoton ic i ty  f o r  
f i x e d  s and h. W e  conclude t h a t  it must be  abandoned. And t h i s ,  
w e  w i l l  see, can be  done a t  e s s e n t i a l l y  no c o s t .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
w e  d i s c a r d  t h e  Quota method a s  w e l l  a s  a l l  quo t a tone  methods 
[71 .  
W e  a r e  l e f t  w i t h  t h e  c l a s s  o f  r e g u l a r  d i v i s o r  methods. 
B i a s  
Why h a s  Hun t ing ton ' s  method of e q u a l  p r o p o r t i o n s  been re- 
t a i n e d  f o r  U . S .  Congress iona l  appor t ionment  from among t h e  f i v e  
h i s t o r i c  d i v i s o r  methods? I f  one i n s p e c t s  examples,  it is i m -  
med ia t e ly  e v i d e n t  t h a t  a s  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  Adams' method it succeeded 
by a p p l i c a t i o n  of  Dean ' s ,  t hen  Hun t ing ton ' s ,  Webs t e r ' s  and 
J e f f e r s o n ' s ,  s o l u t i o n s  t e n d  more and more t o  f a v o r  l a r g e  s t a t e s  
ove r  s m a l l .  Th i s  behav ior  can be  proved ( [ 9 I , Theorem 1 ) . 
Two r e a s o n s  w e r e  used t o  adop t  Hun t ing ton ' s  method: ( 1 )  it i s  
i n  t h e  middle  of t h e  f i v e  from t h e  p o i n t  of  view of  f a v o r i n g  
* 
sma l l  a s  v e r s u s  l a r g e  , ( 2 )  it i s  based on a  measure o f  p a i r w i s e  
i n e q u a l i t y  of  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  between s t a t e s  which (wh i l e  a r b i t r a r y )  
seems p r e f e r a b l e  t o  t h o s e  measures o f  i n e q u a l i t y  which c h a r a c t e r -  
i z e  t h e  o t h e r  f o u r  methods ( [ I  0,161 ) . 
I n  t h e s e  r e p o r t s  no a b s o l u t e  s t a n d a r d  f o r d e t e r m i n i n g  whether  
a  method f a v o r s  sma l l  a s  a g a i n s t  l a r g e  s t a t e s  was se t  down. The 
d e s i r e  t o  choose a  method which i s  "unbiased"  i n  i t s  award o f  
s e a t s  t o  s m a l l  and l a r g e  s t a t e s  i s  w e l l  founded,  and i s  r o o t e d  
i n  t h e  " h i s t o r i c  compromise" i n  which t h e  Sena t e  was g iven  re- 
p r e s e n t a t i o n  independent  o f  p o p u l a t i o n ,  and each  s t a t e  was a s -  
su r ed  o f  a t  l e a s t  one s e a t  i n  t h e  House. 
Suppose t h a t  a  p a i r  o f  s t a t e s  w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n s  ( p , q ) ,  p > q  
r e c e i v e  ( a , b )  s e a t s .  I f  a/p > b/q t h e n  t h e  l a r g e r  s t a t e  i s  
favored  whereas i f  a/p < b/q t h e  s m a l l e r  s t a t e  i s  f avo red .  
I n h e r e n t  t o  u n i f o r m i t y  i s  t h e  t r u e - t o - l i f e  f a c t  t h a t  a  s t a t e  
judges how w e l l  o r  how bad ly  it has  been t r e a t e d  by making com- 
p a r i s o n s  w i t h  i t s  sister s t a t e s '  a l l o c a t i o n s .  Indeed ,  t h i s  ob- 
s e r v a t i o n  was a t  t h e  o r i g i n  of  Hun t ing ton ' s  approach ,  a l t hough  
he t h e n  developed methods based on a d m i t t e d l y  a r b i t r a r y  measures 
of  i n e q u a l i t y  between s t a t e s '  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  B y  d e f i n i t i o n  a  
uniform method a p p o r t i o n s  s e a t s  among every  two s t a t e s  i n  t h e  
same manner a s  it would w e r e  t h e  two cons ide red  a l o n e .  There- 
f o r e ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  set  S ( a , b )  o f  a l l  two s t a t e  problems ( p , q )  
(normal ized ,  by homogeneity, t o  p  + q  = 1 )  which y i , e ld  t h e  ap- 
por t ionment  ( a , b )  , a  > b  2 - 1  ( imply ing ,  by popu la t i on  monoton- 
i c i t y ,  p  2 q ) .  A d i v i s o r  method d ( * )  i s  unbiased  i f  t h e  measure 
o f  t h e  s u b s e t  o f  S ( a , b )  o f  t h o s e  p o p u l a t i o n s  f o r  which t h e  sma l l  
s t a t e  i s  f avo red  i s  t h e  same a s  t h e  measure o f  t h e  s u b s e t  f o r  
which t h e  l a r g e  s t a t e  i s  f a v o r e d ,  f o r  a l l  p a i r s  ( a , b ) ,  a  > b  2 - 1 .  
So, i ndependen t ly  o f  t h e  magnitudes o f  a  and b ,  an  unb iased  method 
d ( * )  n e i t h e r  f a v o r s  sma l l  n o r  l a r g e  ove r  t h e  se t  of  a l l  problems. 
* 
I t  was f o r t u n a t e ,  f o r  t h i s  l o g i c ,  t h a t  t h e  number o f  methods 
cons ide red  was odd. 
Theorem 7. The unique uniform, populat ion monotone, and 
unbiased method i s  t h a t  of  Webster. 
Dually,  one might approach t h e  concept of "b ia s"  by f i x i n g  
(p ,q)  , p + q = 1 , p 4 q,  and cons ider ing  t h e  apportionments of 
h  = 1 ,2 ,3 ,  ..., h* s e a t s ,  where h* i s  t h e  s m a l l e s t  i n t e g e r  f o r  
which ph* and qh* a r e  i n t e g e r .  A method i s  "unbiased" i f  t h e  
number of  t imes t h e  smal l  s t a t e  i s  favored is  t h e  same a s  t h e  
number of t i m e s  t h e  l a r g e  s t a t e  is  favored,  f o r  a l l  p a i r s  ( p , q ) ,  
p + q  = 1 ,  p q.  By t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  t h e  method of  Webster is  
again t h e  unique uniform, popula t ion  monotonerand "unbiased" 
method. 
S p e c i f i c  apportionments f o r  a  g iven  problem can be analyzed 
f o r  b i a s .  In spec t  each p a i r  of a l l o c a t i o n s  t o  s t a t e s  ( a , b )  where 
a  > b 2 - 1 and d e f i n e  t h e  b i a s  r a t i o  t o  be t h e  number of t i m e s  
t h e  sma l l e r  s t a t e  i s  favored d iv ided  by t h e  t o t a l  number of com- 
pa r i sons .  One cannot  expec t  any r e g u l a r  d i v i s o r  method t o  y i e l d  
a  p e r f e c t  b i a s  r a t i o  of  .5: f o r  some problems t h e  r a t i o s  t end  t o  
be high,  f o r  o t h e r s  low. Bias  i s  a concept concerning many 
problems and s o  must be app l i ed  over  many problems. W e  have 
taken t h e  19 census popula t ions  o f  t h e  United S t a t e s  (1  790-1970 
i n c l u s i v e )  and found apportionments by each of t h e  h i s t o r i c  f i v e  
methods toge the r  wi th  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  b i a s  r a t i o s  f o r  every  c a s e  
( see  Table 2 ) .  
To compare t h e  o v e r a l l  t endencies  of t h e  f i v e  methods count 
f o r  each method t h e  number o f  t i m e s  t h e  sma l l e r  s t a t e  i s  favored 
over  a l l  19 problems and d i v i d e  by t h e  number of comparisons t o  
ob ta in  t h e  b i a s  r a t i o  over  t h e  course  of  U . S .  Congressional  
h i s t o r y  (see Table 1 ) .  Huntington 's  method of  equa l  p ropor t ions ,  
now i n  use ,  has b i a s  r a t i o  .562 and dec idedly  f a v o r s  t h e  s m a l l  
s t a t e s .  
J.Q. Adams J. Dean E.V. Huntington D. Webster T. Jefferson 
Table 1 .  Bias r a t i o  over 1790-1970 U.S. Censuses 
J . Q .  Adms J. Dean E.V. Huntington D. Webster T. Je f fe r son  
Table  2 .  B i a s  r a t i o  f o r  e ach  U.S. Census p o p u l a t i o n  
The more d e t a i l e d  y e a r l y  f i g u r e s  o f  Table  2 show t h a t  f o r  
some s p e c i f i c  problems (1880 i s  t h e  one example) Hun t ing ton ' s  
method i s  less b i a s e d  t h a n  Webs te r ' s ,  w h i l e  f o r  o t h e r s  ( e .g . ,  
1820, 1920) t h e  r e v e r s e  ho lds .  Th i s  i s  unavoidable .  O v e r a l l  
t h e  s t a t i s t i c s  s u s t a i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s :  t h e  Webster method is  i n -  
d i c a t e d  i f  b i a s  is  t o  be  avoided.  
Minimum Requirements 
The U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  each  s t a t e  r e c e i v e  a  
minimum o f  1  s e a t ,  F rance  a s s u r e s  each of  i t s  depar tements  a t  
l e a s t  2 s e a t s ,  t h e  European Par l i ament  h a s  f i x e d  minimum numbers 
of s e a t s  a t t a c h e d  t o  each  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  and rang ing  between 
6  and 36. None of  t h e  above developments ha s  e x p l i c i t l y  accounted 
f o r  a  minimum requi rement  o t h e r  than  zero .  However, w i t h  ap- 
p r o p r i a t e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o f  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  t h e  theorems can  b e  ex- 
t ended  and t h e  fundamental  conc lus ions  a r e  t h e  same. 
Conclusion 
Methods of  appor t ionment  must be  ana lyzed  by i d e n t i f y i n g  
t h e  c r i t e r i a  t h e y  s a t i s f y  ( o r  do n o t  s a t i s f y )  and by obse rv ing  
t h e i r  behav ior  when used  f o r  a c t u a l  problems. 
The argument of t h i s  paper may b e  summarized a s  fo l l ows .  
Popula t ion  monoton ic i ty  f o r  f i x e d  s (=50) and h  (=435) means 
t h a t  a  d i v i s o r  method must be  used.  Adjoining u n i f o r m i t y  narrows 
t h e  c h o i c e  t o  a  r e g u l a r  d i v i s o r  method d e f i n e d  independent ly  of 
s and h ,  and g u a r a n t e e s  house monotonic i ty .  The requ i rement  
i n  a d d i t i o n  t h a t  a  method n o t  be  b i a s e d  towards smal l  o r  l a r g e  
s t a t e s  l e a v e s  b u t  one method: t h a t  o f  Webster. 
The major c a s u a l t y  appea r s  t o  be  t h e  l a c k  o f  a  gua ran t ee  
t h a t  appor t ionments  s a t i s f y  quo ta .  I n s i s t i n g  upon t h a t  g u a r a n t e e  
would r u l e  o u t  a l l  popu la t i on  monotone methods and a l l  uniform 
methods. That  i s  t o o  g r e a t  a  p r i c e .  I n  f a c t  t h e  method o f  
Webster does  " b e s t "  among t h e  r e g u l a r  d i v i s o r  methods i n  s a t i s -  
f y i n g  quo ta ,  and f o r  t h r e e  reasons .  
F i r s t ,  a s  w e  have s een ,  it s a t i s f i e s  quota  f o r  s = 3 ,  and 
i s  t h e  o n l y  d i v i s o r  method which does .  Second, w e  say  a  method 
M i s  r e l a t i v e l y  w e l l  rounded-- "almost" s a t i s f i e s  quota  -- i f  f o r  
- 
aEM t h e r e  i s  no p a i r  o f  s t a t e s  wi th  a i  < qi - 1/2 and a j  > q j  
- - 
+ 1/2. The method of Webster is  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  a s  t h e  unique 
d i v i s o r  method which i s  r e l a t i v e l y  w e l l  rounded [4]. Third ,  
empi r i ca l  obse rva t ion  makes c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  even t  of a Webster 
apportionment n o t  s a t i s f y i n g  quota  is  extremely u n l i k e l y .  A 
Monte Car lo  exper iment  confirms t h i s :  f o r  s = 50, h = 435, 
20,000 popu la t ions  w e r e  chosen uniformly over  t h e  simplex 
{ p  ; l p i  = 1 , 435p. 2 .5}. The method o f  Webster v i o l a t e s  quota  
- 1 - 
37 t i m e s .  This  e x t r a p o l a t e s  t o  l e s s  t h a n  one v i o l a t i o n  of quota  
i n  5000 yea r s .  
W e  conclude wi th  Daniel  Webster, " . . . l e t  t h e  r u l e  be ,  t h a t  
t h e  popula t ion  s h a l l  be  d iv ided  by a common d i v i s o r ,  and, i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  number of members r e s u l t i n g  from such d i v i s i o n ,  
a member s h a l l  be al lowed t o  each s t a t e  whose f r a c t i o n  exceeds 
a moiety of t h e  d i v i s o r "  ( [ I  71, p. 120) .  
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